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Research has consistently shown that people consider harmful side effects of an action
more intentional than helpful side effects. This phenomenon is known as the side-
effect effect (SEE), which refers to the influence of moral considerations in judgments
of intentionality and other non-moral concepts. There is an ongoing debate about how
to explain this asymmetric pattern of judgment and the psychological factors involved in
it. It has been posited that affective reactions to agents that bring about harmful side-
effects could bias intentionality attributions in these cases, explaining the asymmetric
pattern of intentionality judgments that we observe in the SEE. We call this the affective
bias hypothesis (ABH). Evidence for the ABH is mixed, with some findings suggesting a
role for affective processes, while others suggesting that affective processes play no role
in the SEE. A possible explanation for these apparently contradictory results points to
affective processes involved in the SEE being confined to anger. In a series of empirical
studies, we systematically measured and manipulated participants’ anger in order to test
this possibility. Our findings suggest that anger play no role in intentionality judgments in
SEE cases, while providing support for a non-emotional motivation to blame as a factor
underlying the SEE.
Keywords: side-effect effect, Knobe effect, intentionality, moral, anger, emotion, motivational bias, affective bias
INTRODUCTION
In everyday social life, we constantly attribute mental states such as beliefs and intentions to others.
This ability to understand other’s mental states, typically called theory of mind or folk psychology,
has been argued to be essential for social functioning and cultural development (Tomasello et al.,
2005). Furthermore, moral and legal systems heavily rely on folk psychology. In most cultures,
whether or not an action is done intentionally influences judgments of moral wrongness (Barrett
et al., 2016). For example, accidentally stepping on someone’s foot is not considered morally wrong,
whereas kicking his foot on purpose is completely inappropriate. Most moral and legal systems
consider intentionality as a fundamental input for judgment of right or wrong. However, recent
investigations suggest that the relationship could also hold in the opposite direction, with moral
judgments influencing folk psychological attributions, at least as regards side effects of actions. In
a seminal study, Knobe (2003) presented participants with the following vignette:
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The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the
board and said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program.
It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the
environment.’
The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about
harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit
as I can. Let’s start the new program.’
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment
was harmed.
When asked whether or not the chairman of the board
intentionally harmed the environment, most participants
answered yes (82%). However, when participants were presented
with the very same vignette, with the only exception of the word
“harm,” which was replaced by “help,” most participants say
that the chairman of the board did not intentionally help the
environment (77%). In both cases the chairman clearly states its
indifference to what happens to the environment, and that he
only desires to make profit. Consequences for the environment in
both cases are thus side effects of the chairman action. Therefore,
if one is viewed as intentional the other should also be. But
the data shows that most people consider that harming the
environment was intentional, whereas helping the environment
was not. Inasmuch as the only difference between both vignettes
is the moral valence of the side-effect, it is concluded that moral
judgments influence intentionality judgments. People usually
assign intentionality for negative side effects (Harm cases), but
not for positive side effects (Help cases). This phenomenon is
known as the side-effect effect (SEE) or the Knobe effect.
One could argue that the abovementioned asymmetry in
intentionality judgments is due to some characteristics of the
vignette used or the surveyed population. Nevertheless, the effect
has been replicated across age groups (Leslie et al., 2006) and
cultures (Knobe and Burra, 2006). Further studies used other
vignettes involving different protagonists and side effects, and
found the same asymmetry between negative and positive side
effects (Mele and Cushman, 2007). The asymmetry remains
even when participants are presented with both Harm and Help
vignettes, and judge the intentionality of both chairmen at the
same time (Pinillos et al., 2011). Moreover, the effect has been
extended to other concepts, as similar asymmetries due to the
influence of moral considerations have been found, for example,
with causality and freedom (Knobe, 2010). In conclusion, the SEE
has proven to be highly robust.
Since Knobe’s seminar study, a large amount of possible
explanations for the SEE have been posited (for a review, see
Cova, 2016), to the point that Knobe himself, who defends his
own explanatory model for the asymmetry, has acknowledged
that probably there is no single explanation for the influence
of moral considerations in non-moral judgments (Phillips et al.,
2015). Instead, it is to expect that each of the different explanatory
factors that have been proposed play some role at least in some
cases of the effect.
Among those explanatory factors, it is of special relevance to
test factors that could be considered a “biasing” or “distorting”
influence. There is an ongoing debate about whether or not the
asymmetrical pattern of intentionality attributions seen in SEE
cases constitutes an error of judgment or not. Some accounts
for the SEE claim that the asymmetry is legitimate. For example,
Knobe (2010) claims that moral considerations are part of our
competence with the concept of intentional action, and Uttich
and Lombrozo (2010) argue that it is rational to take into account
moral considerations when attributing mental states to agents
because norm-breaking behavior is more informative than norm-
abiding behavior. However, other explanations of the SEE argue
that the asymmetrical pattern constitutes an error or irrational
bias, caused by some “external” factor that interferes with how
we should attribute intentionality. Whether or not judgments
in SEE cases are legitimate is relevant for philosophical and
psychological theorizing, as dominant theories of intentional
action (Adams, 1986) and intention attribution (Gopnik and
Wellman, 1992) do not take into account moral considerations. If
the SEE asymmetry is legitimate, those theories should be revised,
but if the asymmetry constitutes an error those theories could
remain unaffected.
The most influential explanation of the SEE as an error is the
motivational bias account (Nadelhoffer, 2004, 2006; Alicke, 2008;
Alicke and Rose, 2012). It posits that a desire to blame the agent
in cases of negative side-effects (e.g., the chairman that harms the
environment) can bias intentionality attributions. Importantly,
they posit a possible psychological mechanism that can trigger
this desire to blame: affective processes. This hypothesis has been
subject of controversy since the early days of the SEE literature,
and arguments and evidence keep accumulating both in favor of
and against it. In this paper, we directly test the role of affective
processes in the SEE. In the following section, we will explain in
more detail the mechanisms by which affective processes could
distort intentionality judgments. We will also present the studies
that have tested the role of affective processes in the SEE to date,
and argue that there is a gap in the empirical literature that
has to be filled in order to advance the debate. In the following
sections, we present three studies designed in order to fill this gap,
the results, and their implications to the debate around how to
explain the SEE.
THE MOTIVATIONAL BIAS ACCOUNT
AND THE ROLE OF AFFECTIVE
PROCESSES IN THE SEE
Thomas Nadelhoffer built on previous research by Alicke (2000)
to explain the SEE asymmetry in terms of a motivational
bias. According to Nadelhoffer (2004, 2006), the moral
blameworthiness of an agent can bias judgments of intentionality
regarding his action or its side effects. While normative models
describe blame assessments as a sequence in which people
evaluate the agent’s mental states and constraints of the situation
in order to reach a decision, the psychology of blame is judged
to be very different. Due to adaptive pressures to quickly
identify wrongdoers, people blame first and search for mitigating
circumstances later. These quick blame judgments might then
act expansively on intentionality attributions.
According to Mark Alicke’s Culpable Control Model of
blame (CCM) (Alicke, 2000), blame attribution depends on the
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agent freedom to bring about desired outcomes, or control.
There are three components of control: mental states, behavior,
and consequences. Connections among these components
yield three structural links: volitional behavior control (the
relationship between mental states and behavior), causal control
(the relationship between behavior and consequences) and
volitional outcome control (relationship between mental states
and consequences). The harder these relationships are, the more
control people attribute to the agent, thus more blame is assigned.
The main point in CCM is that control judgments are influenced
by spontaneous evaluations, which are positive or negative
reactions to an agent’s mental states, behavior and/or outcomes.
Strong negative reactions make people process information in
a “blame validation mode”: their desire to blame makes them
construe control evidence in a way that supports the attribution
they want to make. In the Harm case of the chairman vignette,
negative evaluations of the chairman attitude and the outcome
of his action make people attribute intentionality (volitional
outcome control) in order to justify blame (Alicke and Rose,
2012).
Despite the fact that most of the literature has assumed
that emotion is a necessary component in the motivational
bias hypothesis, the biasing effect of spontaneous evaluations
on attributions of intentionality is not necessarily emotional.
Negative emotions can increase the motivation to blame and
thus intentionality ascriptions, but this motivation to blame
itself does not depend on emotion. In Mark Alicke’s own
words, “spontaneous evaluations are not identical to emotional
reactions”; but “Emotions can certainly heighten one’s positive
and negative evaluations to information about an event” (Alicke,
2008, p. 184). We must distinguish between the motivational
and the affective bias. Affective processes exert their influence
increasing the motivation to blame, and thus the affective bias is
an extension of the motivational bias and depends on it.
Research on the role of affective processes in judgment and
decision making have shown that the abovementioned influence
of affective processes can in fact occur, and it has been explained
in terms of the information or cognitive content carried by
emotions (Clore and Huntsinger, 2007; Lerner et al., 2015). In
particular, several research studies showed that emotion can exert
an “amplifying” influence in judgments of control and blame.
Inducing anger in participants in an unrelated task prior to their
judgments led to higher blame attributions (Lerner et al., 1998;
Goldberg et al., 1999), perception of events as caused by human
agency instead of situational factors (Keltner et al., 1993a), and
increased attributions of volitional and causal control (Ask and
Pina, 2011). Also consistent with the CCM, increasing anger in
mock jurors during a capital punishment trial simulation led to
underestimation of mitigating circumstances and increased the
probability of assigning a death sentence (Georges et al., 2013).
Nevertheless, the evidence for the role of affective processes in
the SEE asymmetry is scarce, indirect, and inconclusive.
On the one hand, Pinillos et al. (2011) found that individuals
that scored higher in the Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) were
less likely to show the asymmetric pattern of intentionality
judgments involved in the SEE. They interpret their results in
terms of system 1 system 2 considerations. To put it simply, as
the CRT is related to controlled, system 2 processes, the SEE
asymmetry is probably due to system 1, automatic and often
emotional processes. Similarly, Cokely and Feltz (2009) found
a positive correlation between extraversion and SEE asymmetry
width. Since the extraversion personality trait is related to
emotional expressiveness, this is also interpreted as evidence
in favor of the affective bias hypothesis (ABH). Finally, Ngo
et al. (2015) found a relationship between self-reported emotional
reactions and intentionality ratings in Harm cases, which was
mediated by blame judgments. However, they failed to replicate
the correlations between intentionality ratings and individual-
difference measures of the previous studies.
On the other hand, Young et al. (2006) found that patients
with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) of
the brain exhibit the same asymmetric pattern of intentionality
judgments in the chairman vignette as normal subjects. Given
that VMPFC patients show emotional deficits across a wide range
of tasks, Young et al. (2006) concluded that emotional processes,
or at least those subserved by the VMPFC, do not play a role
in the SEE. In support of this conclusion is the fact that this
neuropsychological approach has been employed with success
to test the role of emotion in moral cognition (Koenigs et al.,
2007). Moreover, another clinical population known for its severe
emotional deficits, psychopaths, also displays the asymmetry on
intentionality judgments that characterizes the SEE (Cardinale
et al., 2014).
Some have taken the latter research studies with clinical
populations as conclusive evidence against the ABH. However,
the emotional deficits of VMPFC patients and psychopaths do
not affect anger responses, which are in fact exaggerated in
both clinical populations. And as we have seen, anger has been
consistently related to blame. Thus, it seems possible that, as
normal subjects, VMPFC patients and psychopaths experience
anger in response to the SEE scenarios, and this anger motivates a
desire to blame that influences their intentionality judgments. In
three studies, we measured and manipulated participants’ anger
and recorded their responses to SEE cases in order to test this
possibility.
STUDY 1: TRAIT ANGER
In order to test whether anger responses underlie the asymmetry
in intentionality judgments seen in the SEE, we used the Trait
Anger Scale (TAS) (Spielberger, 1999) to measure participants’
propensity to feel anger along with their intentionality ratings
in the original chairman vignette. Spielberger’s Trait Anger
Scale consist on 10 items (e.g., “I am a hotheaded person”)
that participants rate in a scale from 1 (“almost never”) to 4
(“almost always”). It has been successfully used in other studies
investigating the role of affective processes in judgment and
decision making (e.g., Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001).
If feeling angry at the events described in the vignettes is
what makes people consider negative side-effects as intentional,
this judgment would partially depend on people’s tendency
to get angry. Thus, if ABH is true, it is to expect that
individuals’ propensity to experience anger (as measured by the
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TAS) will correlate with their intentionality ratings in Harm
vignettes.
Materials and Methods
One hundred and eighty participants were recruited on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (AMT)1 and completed the survey for a
monetary payment of $0.40. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of our two experimental conditions, which correspond
to the presentation of either the Harm or the Help version
of the chairman vignette. Participants answered four questions
that served as inclusion criteria: two Attention Check Questions
(ACQs), a question about familiarity with the experimental
task, and a question about the experimental hypothesis2. Of
the original sample, eight participants failed the Attention
Check Questions (ACQs), 27 participants affirmed being familiar
with the chairman scenario, and four participants mentioned a
relationship between our independent and dependent variables
when asked about the experimental hypothesis. After excluding
these participants, we had a final sample of 141 participants (58
males, 82 females, 1 other; Mage = 39.26 years, SD= 13.88 years,
age range 20–71 years).
As a cover story, participants were informed they were going
to participate in two separate studies, which had been pooled
together for the sake of convenience. This is a common procedure
used to avoid demand effects (Parrott and Hertel, 2005). The
first study was introduced as a “Self-Evaluation Questionnaire”
about feelings in daily life, and included the TAS along with the
demographic questions. In the second study, labeled “Attitudes
toward hypothetical situations,” participants read the chairman
vignette from the SEE seminal study in its “harm” or “help”
version (see Introduction in this paper). Afterward, participants
answered two different questions about the scenario. First,
participants rated how much they agree with the following
statement “The chairman of the board intentionally harmed
(helped) the environment” on a scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”)
to 7 (“strongly agree”). Second, they responded whether the
chairman of the board should be blamed (praised) for harming
(helping) the environment on a scale from 1 (“definitely yes”) to
7 (“definitely no”).
Results
First, we explored the data to see if parametric test assumptions
were met. Normal Q–Q plots and Kolmogorov–Smirnov test
showed that intentionality scores for Harm, D(61) = 0.308,
p< 0.001, and Help, D(80)= 0.347, p< 0.001, both significantly
1Using AMT as a participant pool is a validated method for data collection in
the social sciences, being that participants are more demographically diverse than
standard Internet and college students samples, and producing data as reliable as
that obtained using traditional pen-and-paper methods (Buhrmester et al., 2011).
2ACQs include their correct answer on the very wording of the question
(Oppenheimer et al., 2009). Thus, incorrect responses show that the participant
is not paying enough attention to the instructions. As research suggest that
participants familiarity with the experimental task could also be an important
problem in crowdsourcing services such as AMT (Chandler et al., 2014), and can
reduce effect sizes (Chandler et al., 2015), excluding participants that are familiar
with the experimental task further ensures the quality of the data. Finally, asking
participants about the experimental hypothesis allows us to control for demand
effects.
FIGURE 1 | Relationship between intentionality attribution in Harm
case and TAS score. Participants who scored higher in dispositional anger,
as measured by Spielberg’s TAS, tended to rate the outcome of harming the
environment as less intentional.
deviated from normal. The same happened with responsibility
scores for Harm, D(61) = 0.366, p < 0.001, and Help,
D(80) = 0.256, p < 0.001. Thus, we used non-parametric tests
to analyze our data: Mann–Witney for comparisons between
conditions, and Spearman’s Rho for correlations.
Moral valence of the side-effect influenced intentionality
judgments. Participants were more willing to view the chairman’s
action as intentional when the side effect was harming the
environment (Mdn = 7.00) than when the side-effect was
helping the environment (Mdn = 1.00), U = 200, z = −9.66,
p < 0.001, r = 0.81. Intentionality ratings in the Harm case were
significantly related to blame, rs = 0.675, p < 0.001, and the
intentionality attributed in the Help case was significantly related
to praise, rs = 0.447, p< 0.001.
As the ABH states that affective reactions to the chairman
action and its outcomes explain the higher intentionality ratings
in Harm cases, but not in Help cases, we analyzed the relationship
between TAS scores and intentionality ratings in Harm and
Help separately. TAS scores were not significantly related to
intentionality in Help cases, rs = 0.150, p = 0.184. TAS scores
were significantly related to intentionality in Harm cases, but
negatively correlated, rs = −0.273, p = 0.033 (Figure 1). Finally,
blame ratings were not significantly related with TAS scores,
rs =−0.212, p= 0.102.
Discussion
While we replicated the SEE, we failed to find support for
the ABH: a higher disposition to get angry (as measured by
the Trait Anger Scale) was not related with higher ratings of
intentionality or blame in Harm cases. To the contrary, higher
rankings in the TAS were associated with lower intentionality
ratings. Considering the possibility that the Trait Anger Scale
might not be a sensitive enough measure of the involvement of
anger in these judgments, or the possibility that participants did
not experience anger at all, we devised a second study in which
we directly manipulated participants’ affective state using anger
elicitation.
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FIGURE 2 | Emotion condition by intentionality scores. Despite
addressing the possibility of ceiling effects, emotion manipulation had no
effect.
STUDY 2: ANGER ELICITATION
Emotion elicitation methods are commonly used to test the
role of affective processes in judgment and decision making
(Harmon-Jones et al., 2007). In particular, we employed
autobiographical recall, which is a widely used emotion elicitation
technique (Lench et al., 2011; Quigley et al., 2014) and has been
validated for internet-based designs (Mills and D’Mello, 2014;
Ferrer et al., 2015). Writing about an emotional experience before
the experimental task modifies participants’ affective state, and
the influence of that affective state in judgment can be measured
comparing to a control group.
The ABH posits that emotional reactions underlie the
asymmetric attributions of intentionality between Harm and
Help cases. Thus, it predicts that participants in a more
intense emotional state (anger in particular) would show a
more pronounced asymmetry in their intentionality judgments
between Harm and Help cases, because they will show higher
intentionality ratings in Harm cases.
Materials and Methods
Three hundred and five participants were recruited on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (AMT) and filled the survey in exchange for
$0.80. Participants were randomly assigned either to the anger
elicitation group or the control group. As in Study 2, we included
two ACQs, a question about familiarity with the chairman
vignette, and another question regarding suspicion about the
experimental hypothesis. Twenty-one participants failed both
ACQs, 27 were familiar with the chairman vignette, and 19
suspected a relationship between the emotion induction task and
their responses to the chairman case, leaving a final sample of
238 participants (88 males, 150 females; Mage = 35.67 years,
SD= 12.15 years, age range 18–71 years).
The same “separate studies” cover story of Study 1 was used to
control for demand effects. The first study, labeled “memory for
life events,” was the autobiographical recall emotion induction.
Participants in the anger condition were instructed to write down
the three things that make them most angry. Afterward, they
were told to describe in detail one situation that made them feel
extremely angry (Lerner and Keltner, 2001). They were instructed
to provide as much detail as possible and to vividly recall what
happened and how they felt (Strack et al., 1985). Participants in
the control condition wrote about the last time they went grocery
shopping, and listed the three things that they buy most often
when they go grocery shopping. In the second study, they read
both the Help and Harm versions of the chairman vignette, whose
order of presentation was counterbalanced. Afterward, they rated
on a scale from−10 (“completely disagree”) to+10 (“completely
agree”) how much they agreed with the following statements:
“The chairman of the board intentionally harmed (helped) the
environment” and “The chairman of the board is accountable for
harming (helping) the environment.” We chose a 21-point Likert
scale to increase discriminating power (Preston and Colman,
2000).
To confirm that our emotion elicitation worked, we included
a manipulation check in which participants self-reported their
current feelings. They were instructed to rate on a 0 (“not at all”)
to 8 (“extremely”) scale to what extent they were experiencing a
list of different emotions. We included two anger-related words
(“angry” and “irritated,” α = 0.874), and five more categories
corresponding to other fundamental emotions: “fearful,” “happy,”
“repulsed,” “sad,” and “surprised.” Because it has been shown
that labeling emotions after the experimental manipulation can
reduce their influence in subsequent judgments (Keltner et al.,
1993b), emotional ratings were presented at the end of the survey.
Results
First, we subtracted participants’ intentionality ratings in the
Help scenario to their intentionality ratings in the Harm
scenario to obtain an “asymmetry” measure. Normal Q–Q
plots and Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests showed that scores for
asymmetry, intentionality, accountability, and the different
emotion categories in our manipulation check were not normally
distributed across groups (all p < 0.05). Thus, we employed
non-parametric tests to analyze our data: Mann–Witney U test
for comparisons between conditions, and Spearman’s Rho for
correlations.
We again replicated the SEE, as participants attributed more
intentionality in Harm cases (Mdn = 21.00) than in Help cases
(Mdn = 1.00), z = −12.45, p < 0.001, r = −0.81. There was a
significant relationship between intentionality and accountability
ratings, both for HARM, rs = 0.620, p < 0.001, and Help cases,
rs = 0.273, p< 0.001.
Participants’ self-reported anger scores were significantly
higher in the experimental group (Mdn = 1.00) than in the
control group (Mdn= 0.00), U = 5067.00, z =−4.30, p< 0.001,
r = −0.28. Although to a lesser degree, disgust ratings were also
significantly higher in the experimental group (Mdn = 0.00),
compared to the control group (Mdn = 0.00), U = 5844.00,
z = −2.80, p = 0.005, r = −0.18. All ratings for other emotion
categories did not significantly differ between conditions (all
p> 0.05).
Asymmetry scores in the anger condition (Mdn = 16.00) did
not differ significantly from control condition (Mdn = 17.00),
U = 7030.00, z = −0.083, p = 0.934, r = −0.05. The SEE
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asymmetry was as large in the anger group (Harm Mdn = 21.00,
Help Mdn = 1.00) as it was in the control group (Harm
Mdn = 21.00, Help Mdn = 1.00). Accountability ratings
were similar across conditions, both for Harm, U = 6878.50,
z =−0.421, p= 0.674, r =−0.03, and Help cases, U = 65780.50,
z =−0.938, p= 0.348, r =−0.06.
Discussion
Again, our results failed to confirm the ABH predictions. The
SEE was elicited, but while the anger induction procedure was
effective, it had no effect on intentionality and accountability
ratings. However, one could argue that these results are due to
a ceiling effect, given that intentionality ratings were maximal.
In Study 3 we introduced changes in our experimental design in
order to address this problem.
STUDY 3: ANGER ELICITATION AND
MITIGATING FACTORS
To avoid the problem of ceiling effects, our third study used
vignettes involving a “mitigating factor” (Seidel and Prinz, 2013).
Previous research has shown that manipulating the valence of the
agent’s main goal (from making profit to a generous one) reduces
intentionality ascriptions in Harm cases (Shepherd, 2012). Thus,
we used cases in which the valence of the side effect is negative,
but the agent’s main goal is positive. As affective processes are
supposed to play a role only in intentionality attributions in Harm
cases, and in order to increase power, we did not include Help
cases. We selected two scenarios from the previous literature:
Planner (Phelan and Sarkissian, 2008) and Modified Lieutenant
(Phelan and Sarkissian, 2009). They were simplified in order to
control for possible influences of the different wordings (Ngo
et al., 2015).
In addition to using scenarios involving a mitigating factor,
we also introduced a new emotion condition: amusement.
Research has shown that inducing amusement in participants can
reduce responses which are associated with negative emotional
reactions to the task at hand, such as “deontological responses”
to the footbridge dilemma (Valdesolo and Desteno, 2006). As
the ABH posits that affective reactions explain attributions of
intentionality in Harm cases, much like affective reactions explain
deontological responses in the footbridge dilemma, we predicted
that participants in the amusement condition would attribute
less intentionality in SEE scenarios involving harmful side-effects
than those in the control condition.
Materials and Methods
Two hundred and fifty-three participants were recruited on
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) and filled the survey in
exchange for $0.70. Questions about familiarity, suspicion,
and attention check questions were the same as in Study
2. Participants were randomly assigned to one of our
three emotional manipulation conditions: anger, control or
amusement. Eleven participants failed the two ACQs, 2 were
familiar with the vignettes we used, and 25 were suspicious
about the experimental hypothesis, leaving a final sample of
215 participants (86 males, 129 females; Mage = 34.43 years,
SD= 11.25 years, age range 19–72 years).
The cover story and emotion induction were the same as in
Study 2. In the new amusement condition, participants were
told to list the three things that make them laugh the most,
and then were instructed to write for 5 min about a personal
experience that made them feel extremely amused. After the
emotion elicitation, participants received both the following
vignettes:
Planner (Phelan and Sarkissian, 2008):
The city planner started a plan to address the pollution
problem.
He did not care about the effect the plan would have on
joblessness.
He knew his plan would increase joblessness.
Modified Lieutenant (Phelan and Sarkissian, 2009):
The lieutenant sent a squad of soldiers to Thomson Hill in
order to succeed in the campaign.
He did not care about the effect the strategy would have on
soldiers.
He knew the soldiers sent to Thomson Hill would be in the line
of fire and some of them would be killed.
Order of presentation was counterbalanced. The intentionality
question was “Did the city planner/lieutenant intentionally raise
joblessness levels/cause the soldiers’ death?” which participants
responded in a 1 (“not intentional at all”) to 8 (“completely
intentional”) scale. Participants rated whether the vignette’s
protagonist should be blamed for his action’s side-effect from 1
(“not blameworthy at all”) to 8 (“completely blameworthy”).
The manipulation check was presented after the intentionality
and responsibility judgments. It consisted of seven items:
“angry,” “amused,” “fearful,” “repulsed,” “sad,” and “surprised.”
Participants rated to what extent they were experiencing those
feelings on a 0 (“not at all”) to 8 (“extremely”) scale.
Results
Intentionality ratings for Planner and Lieutenant scenarios
yielded relatively high reliability (α = 0.712). Thus, we created
a composite score by averaging the intentionality ratings across
the two scenarios, and used it as the dependent variable in our
main analysis. We did the same with blame scores (α = 0.515).
Once again, linear model assumptions were not met. Normal
Q–Q plots and Kolmogorov–Smirnov test showed that scores for
intentionality, blame, and emotion categories were not normally
distributed (all p < 0.05). Thus, we used non-parametric tests
to analyze the data: Kruskal–Wallis for comparisons between
groups, and Spearman’s Rho for correlations.
Our manipulation significantly affected participants self-
reported amusement, H(2) = 17.98, p < 0.001. Pairwise
comparisons with adjusted p-values showed that there were
significant differences in amusement between control and
amusement groups (p = 0.005, r = 0.26), and between anger
and amusement groups (p < 0.001, r = 0.35), but not between
anger and control groups (p = 0.840, r = 0.09). Anger ratings
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were also affected by our manipulation, H(2) = 32.96, p < 0.001.
There were significant differences in self-reported anger between
control and anger groups (p < 0.001, r = 0.36), and between
anger and amusement groups (p < 0.001, r = 0.47), but not
between amusement and control groups (p = 0.547, r = 0.11).
Our manipulation also affected participants’ levels of sadness,
H(2) = 6.91, p = 0.032. There were significant differences
in sadness between amusement and anger groups (p = 0.026,
r = 0.23), although not between amusement and control groups
(p = 0.362, r = 0.13), neither between anger and control groups
(p = 0.702, r = 0.10). Other emotions were not affected by our
manipulation (all p> 0.05).
Descriptive analysis showed that scores did not cluster at the
end of the scale neither for intentionality (Mdn= 6.0) nor blame
(Mdn= 6.0). Intentionality ratings were not significantly affected
by emotion, H(2) = 1.26, p = 0.533 (Figure 2), and neither was
blame, H(2) = 5.16, p = 0.076. Intentionality ratings were again
significantly related to responsibility scores, rs = 0.572, p< 0.001.
Discussion
After controlling for ceiling effects, our third experiment failed
again to find support for ABH. Although intentionality and blame
ratings were not maximal, they remained unaffected by emotion.
The results reinforce those obtained in Study 2 and add more
evidence against the role of affective processes in the SEE.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The motivational bias account for the SEE posits the possibility
of affective reactions playing a role on intentionality attributions
(ABH), because affective reactions can heighten negative
evaluations of the situation at hand. These negative evaluations
are supposed to trigger a motivation to blame, which in turn
acts expansively on intentionality ascriptions. After reviewing
the available empirical tests for the ABH and the literature
about emotion and blame, we hypothesized that the affective
reactions underlying the SEE could be confined to anger. In three
different studies, we failed to find a relationship between anger
and intentionality ratings in SEE cases.
In our first study, participants’ tendency to feel anger as
measured by Spielberger’s TAS was in fact negatively correlated
with intentionality ascriptions in SEE cases. In our second study,
inducing anger in participants by making them write about a
situation in which they felt intense anger did not affect their
intentionality ratings, a result which was replicated in study 3
after addressing the problem regarding possible ceiling effects.
Inconsistent with the existing literature on the topic, we did
not find a relationship between anger and blame in any of our
studies. However, we systematically found a relationship between
responsibility judgments and intentionality judgments.
There are some limitations in our studies. Regarding Study
1, Spielberger’s TAS may not be the best choice when studying
moral anger responses, and participants that scored higher in
the TAS scale might not experience higher anger reactions to
the chairman vignette. Our emotion elicitation technique has
limitations too, since there were significant differences across
groups in self-reports of emotions that were not the target of
our manipulation. In study 2, our manipulation was successful
in inducing anger on participants, but it also induced another
negative emotion, disgust. In study 3, apart from anger and
amusement, our manipulation influenced participants’ levels of
reported sadness. However, other widely-used emotion elicitation
methods suffer from the same problems. For example, film clips
selected for inducing anger also elicit significant changes in
participants’ levels of disgust and sadness (Gross and Levenson,
1995; Rottenberg et al., 2007). Furthermore, and of special
interest here, anger-inducing film clips have been successfully
used to increase participants blame attributions (Lerner et al.,
1998; Goldberg et al., 1999).
Our results are in line with the conclusions of Young et al.
(2006) and Cardinale et al. (2014). As we mentioned in the
introduction, VMPFC patients and psychopaths are capable of
angry responses, and thus these studies left open the possibility
of anger playing a role in attributions of intentional action in SEE
cases. However, our results suggest that anger does not play a role
in the SEE. Our investigation completes these studies, answering
this possible objection to them, and adds to the literature a new
empirical study that speaks against the ABH.
On the other hand, the interpretation of our results seems
inconsistent with those from Ngo et al. (2015), who claimed
that the relationship they found between emotional reaction and
intentionality ratings in SEE Harm cases supports the ABH.
Ngo et al. (2015) interesting methodology notwithstanding, there
are some limitations in their study that might be relevant here.
First, since they do not systematically manipulate participants’
emotion, it is controversial to interpret their results in terms
of causation. Second, their “emotional reaction” measure has
limitations. Participants rated “How harming (or helping) the
environment make you feel?” in a −3 (very negative) to 3
(very positive) scale. By stating the object, participants could
have interpreted the question as asking for a (non-necessarily
emotional) evaluation of the event (Alicke, 2008), or a “cold”
emotional attitude instead of an emotional episode (Hacker,
2004). Third, the fact that this measure also correlated with
brain activity in the amygdala in Harm cases is considered as
evidence for the presence of emotion, as the amygdala has been
related to emotion in several fMRI studies. However, inferring the
presence of a particular cognitive process by finding activity in
one particular brain region, or reverse inference (Poldrack, 2006),
is unjustified because most brain regions have been related to
several different cognitive processes (Miller, 2008). In particular,
the amygdala has also been associated with processes, such
as processing novel material, that can be emotional or non-
emotional (Pessoa, 2010; Barret and Satpute, 2013).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we tested the role of anger on intentionality
attributions for negative side effects to which the agent expresses
indifference. The results across our three studies, together with
those of Young et al. (2006) and Cardinale et al. (2014), are
inconsistent with the ABH. It is important to note that our studies
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do not offer evidence against the motivational bias hypothesis
(Nadelhoffer, 2006; Alicke and Rose, 2012) per se, but against
this motivational bias being driven by anger. Although our data
suggest that anger do not play a role on intentionality attributions
in SEE scenarios, responsibility judgments consistently correlated
with intentionality attributions in both Harm and Help cases
across all of our studies. Thus, a motivation to blame the agent
could be partially explaining intentionality ascriptions in SEE
cases. This lack of relationship between anger and blame is
perhaps our most surprising finding, taking into account the
existing literature on the topic. Our second and third studies
failed to find a relationship between anger and blame, and even
more strikingly, our first study found a negative relationship
between both.
We suggest that further studies should test the motivational
bias hypothesis without considering it to be necessarily driven
by affective processes, as accumulating evidence suggest this is
not the case. On the other hand, we call for further testing and
reassessment of the relationship between anger and blame.
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